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The Effect of Minimum Wages on Wages and Employment: 
County-Level Estimates for the United States 
 
We use county-level data on employment and earnings in the restaurant-and-bar sector to 
evaluate the impact of minimum wage changes on low-wage labor markets. Our empirical 
approach is similar to the literature that has used state-level panel data to estimate minimum-
wage impacts, with the difference that we focus on a particular sector rather than 
demographic group. Our estimated models are consistent with a simple competitive model of 
the restaurant-and-bar labor market in which supply-and-demand factors affect both the 
equilibrium outcome and the probability that a minimum wage will be binding in any given 
time period. Our evidence does not suggest that minimum wages reduce employment in the 
overall restaurant-and-bar sector, after controls for trends in sector employment at the county 
level are incorporated in the model. Employment in this sector appears to exhibit a downward 
long-term trend in states that have increased their minimum wages relative to states that 
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 Does increasing the minimum wage lead to lower employment?  At one time, the answer 
from economists was an emphatic yes.  Theory pointed in this direction, as did the early 
round of statistical estimates from labor economists.  But the conventional wisdom was 
challenged in a series of studies by Card (1992a, 1992b), Katz and Krueger (1992), and 
Card and Krueger (1994) that instead indicated minimal, even positive employment 
effects.  Unlike the earlier research using time-series evidence, this new literature focused 
on employment changes accompanying isolated increases in the minimum wage, often 
exploiting geographic variation in the likely impact of these increases.  These new 
findings did not go uncontested.  For example, in updating the earlier time-series research 
to accommodate cross-state variation in minimum wages, Neumark and Wascher (1992) 
obtained results that were generally consistent with the prior received wisdom.   
Although the “new” minimum-wage research largely used geographic variation to 
help identify employment effects, the underlying studies did so in quite different ways.  
Neumark and Wascher (1992) exploited a long panel of state-level observations on 
teenager and young adult employment to study the relationship with the state’s minimum 
wage.   This estimation approach allowed for a fixed state effect in employment 
outcomes, albeit one assumed not to vary over time.  For their part, Card and Krueger 
(1994) studied employment among franchised restaurants in the fast-food sector in two 
states (New Jersey and Pennsylvania), with two observations per restaurant surrounding a 
1992 increase in the minimum wage in New Jersey.  The first-difference estimation 
technique employed by Card and Krueger also allowed for a state effect – and one that 
  2could in principle vary over time – but focused on a restricted geographic area.
1  As has 
been argued previously, this restriction in the geographic focus may have provided a 
natural experiment that statistically speaking is uninformative. 
  The major purpose of the present study is to combine the approaches of Neumark 
and Wascher (1992) and Card and Krueger (1994), so as to determine the sensitivity of 
the estimated minimum-wage effects to some of the modeling decisions made in these 
studies.  Using county-level data on employment, we estimate panel-data models similar 
to those of Neumark and Wascher, being careful to consider the importance of the 
assumptions made about the error-correlation structure.  For the most part, our estimation 
strategy is similar to theirs.  The primary difference is that we focus on a particular sector 
(restaurants and bars) rather than a particular demographic group (teenagers).  This 
sectoral focus is similar to that of Card and Krueger, though we are able to extend the 
geographic reach considerably.  In general, our findings do not support the negative 
employment effects predicted for minimum wages.  Our estimates are otherwise 
consistent with a competitive model, however, in suggesting a very small elasticity of 
labor demand in the restaurant-and-bar sector.  And there is a further qualification: when 
we examine the fast-food part of the restaurant-and-bar sector does there is some 
indication of a negative employment effect in the wake of higher minimum wages. 
 
I.  Statistical Problems in the Minimum-Wage Literature 
The empirical evidence concerning minimum-wage impacts has been surveyed on 
numerous occasions, both in respect of the initial aggregate time-series studies (for 
                                                 
1 The other studies by Card, Katz and/or Krueger also tended to use first-difference 
approaches over a short time series  
  3example, Brown, Gilroy, and Kohen, 1982) and the state-based estimations of more 
recent vintage (both Brown, 1999, and Neumark and Wascher, 2006, provide useful 
summaries).   The time-series evidence generally suggested minimum-wage impacts that 
were small and declining over time, while the later, and arguably preferable, evidence 
from studies making use of both time-series and cross-section variation produced no 
general consensus.  Hence, the most recent literature has in part sought to reconcile the 
disparate findings of the initial cross-state studies. 
There is a potential statistical complication in much of the research using cross-
state variation in minimum wages that may have led to an overstatement of the precision 
of estimates generated in the literature.  We refer to the problems of inference that arise 
when using “difference-in-difference” estimates, as documented by Bertrand, Duflo, and 
Mullainathan (2004) and Donald and Lang (2007).  The former authors show that 
difference-in-difference estimates can be interpreted as estimates from a fixed-effects 
panel-data regression with policy-related independent variables that are often measured at 
a higher level of aggregation than the dependent variable.  For example, in the Card and 
Krueger (1994) regression the dependent variable is measured for a given restaurant in a 
given time period, while the minimum wage varies only at the more aggregated 
state/time-period level.  Similar to Moulton (1990), Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan 
argue that the assumption that error terms are uncorrelated across restaurants in the same 
state/time-period can lead to severely biased inference if the actual correlation in these 
observations is nonzero. 
When there is the potential for a high degree of potential correlation in the error 
terms within cross-sectional units over time, an increasingly common approach to 
  4statistical inference with panel data is to use “panel-corrected standard errors” (originally 
due to Liang and Zeger, 1986).   Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004) note that this 
is a strategy that can work relatively well, as long as the number of cross-sectional units 
(in this case, the number of states) is relatively large.  A weakness of the Card and 
Krueger (1994) approach is that the number of cross-sectional units considered is quite 
small (only New Jersey and Pennsylvania).  If there is any tendency for error terms to be 
correlated across restaurants in the same state, inference using the difference-in-
difference regression estimated by Card and Krueger is likely to be unreliable. 
For their part, Donald and Lang (2007) raise an additional point concerning the 
estimation of policy impacts using natural experiments with a limited geographic range.  
Specifically, a required assumption in the approach of Card and Krueger (1994) is that 
the only possible reason for a difference in the average change in employment between 
New Jersey and Pennsylvania is the minimum-wage increase that occurred in New 
Jersey.  It would seem more appropriate to assume that this difference in averages could 
also be affected by other (unobserved) changes between the two states.
2  If so, the Card-
Krueger difference-in-difference estimate of the policy impact does not follow a well-
defined distribution, even as the number of restaurants surveyed in each state approaches 
infinity.
3  The concerns over proper measurement of the dependent variable – a major 
                                                 
2 For example, if changes in the macro economy affected restaurant employment 
differently in New Jersey and Pennsylvania, the implicit assumption of Card and Krueger 
would be incorrect. 
3 The result of Donald and Lang is that, in this case, the appropriate distribution is a t-
distribution with S-2 degrees of freedom, where S is the number of states in the sample.  
In Card and Krueger this is 0 degrees of freedom.  These issues are also relevant in our 
later analysis, although the use of 50 states mitigates these concerns to a great extent. 
  5source of contention between Neumark and Wascher (2000) and Card and Krueger 
(2000) – become moot once this shortcoming of the natural experiment is acknowledged. 
Differences in the level of aggregation between the dependent and independent 
variables would appear to be less important in the study by Neumark and Wascher 
(1992).  Both the dependent and independent variables vary across states and time-
periods, and the number of states used in the estimation is reasonably large.  Neumark 
and Wascher do assume non-correlation in the error terms over time within states (after 
removing fixed effects), and a violation of this assumption would imply that their 
standard errors are inconsistent.  Inference robust to this intrastate correlation can still be 
performed (and the results in Neumark and Wascher, 2007, still suggest a negative 
employment effect after correcting standard errors).  Deere, Murphy, and Welch (1995) 
have also pointed to potential biases arising from cross-state variation in underlying 
trends when these trends are correlated with the minimum-wage measure.  While their 
criticism was directed at the work of Card (1992a), it is also a concern for the type of 
empirical approach used in Neumark and Wascher (1992).  In our case, we measure 
minimum-wage impacts over a 16-year period, and it would seem somewhat unlikely that 
the tendency for a state to be above or below the economy-wide average in employment 
would not vary over this period.  As we show later, this becomes a particular concern 
when the evolution of the minimum-wage variable may be correlated with this state-level 
trend in employment.  
Our models are estimated using county-level data from the Quarterly Census of 
Employment and Wages (QCEW).  We are not the first to use these data in studying 
minimum wages.  Kim and Taylor (1995) used the data for counties in California to study 
  6the 1988 increase in the California minimum wage, obtaining some evidence of a 
negative employment effect.  Another case study that used the QCEW is Orazem and 
Mattila (2002), who report evidence of a disemployment effect from the 1990-91 federal 
minimum changes among counties in Iowa.
4  Both analyses are quite limited in their 
geographic focus, however, and are moreover susceptible to the criticisms of Betrand, 
Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) if there are substantial state-level effects in employment.  
Both Neumark and Wascher (2000) and Card and Kruger (2000) also made use of the 
QCEW data in their discussion of the New Jersey/Pennsylvania experiment, but did not 
expand the analysis past the original limited focus. 
  A limited geographic focus is not a concern in the very recent analysis of Dube, 
Lester, and Reich (2007).
5  They make use of the QCEW data from 1990-2006 in the 
restaurant sector to generalize the case-study approach, while also allowing a comparison 
with the national panel studies.  Their approach is based on comparisons of state-border 
counties (or counties within general metro areas that contain state borders), allowing for a 
county-pair effect that is specific to each time period.  Variation in minimum wages 
between border counties then allows for the identification of minimum-wage effects.  
This identification is similar to that used in Card and Krueger (1994), but does not suffer 
from the inference problems of that study given the large number of border-county 
                                                 
4 Both of these studies garner the identification of their minimum wage effects through 
the variation in average wages across counties.  This identification strategy is doubtful if 
average wages affect employment holding constant the minimum-wage/average-wage 
ratio.  We shall argue that there are both theoretical and empirical reasons to doubt this 
identification. 
5 We became aware of their study in the course of our own. Their approach is similar to 
ours in their use of a nationwide sampling frame in a county-level analysis of the QCEW 
data. Although there are several small differences between the two studies in sectors and 
method of examination, the main difference resides in how we control for county-level 
differences in employment associated with factors other than the minimum wage. 
  7comparisons used in the estimation.  Their results suggest little evidence of minimum-
wage effects on employment once county-pair effects are controlled for in the model. 
  Our paper also makes use of a nationwide county-level sample from the QCEW, 
but our estimation approach is closer to Neumark and Wascher (1992) than to Card and 
Krueger (1994).  A key extension of our analysis is to allow for county-specific trends in 
employment and earnings in the restaurant-and-bar sector.  We also incorporate 
additional county-level factors that potentially affect employment and earnings.  
Estimation of models with these additional factors allows us to assess the extent to which 
our results are consistent with a competitive-model explanation of employment and 
earnings determination.   
 
II. Theoretical Framework: Competitive-Market Effects of Minimum Wages 
Empirical studies of minimum wage effects are typically motivated by a simple one-
sector model of low-wage labor markets that assumes the minimum wage exceeds the 
market-clearing wage.   Discussions of the relevance of two-sector models in which part 
of the labor market is not covered by the minimum wage might also be included (see, for 
example, Brown, 1999), though the high coverage rates of minimum wage laws in recent 
years have generally led recent studies to discount the importance of such concerns.  The 
fact that potential employees in the studied markets might earn above the minimum wage 
is often pointed out in interpreting the results of estimated models, where it is noted that 
the estimated employment elasticities with respect to minimum wages tend to understate 
the related labor-demand elasticities. 
  8The following stylized model of low-wage labor markets explicitly takes into 
account the possibility that studied markets may have market-clearing wages above the 
minimum.  The model starts by assuming constant-elasticity forms for labor supply and 
labor demand in a market.  In particular, let labor demand be determined by 
X w E
d β =  , 
where 
d E is the number of workers desired at wage w.  The parameterβ  represents the 
labor-demand elasticity, while X is a positive-valued index of demand factors that shift 
the labor demand curve.  Labor supply is determined by 
   ,  Z w E
S γ =
where γ  is the labor-supply elasticity and Z is a positive-valued index of supply factors. 
If the minimum wage ( ) is not binding in this market, the equilibrium wage 
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  9Alternatively, given that d is an indicator function, the log of observed employment can 
be expressed as 
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Conditioning on  , X, and Z , the expected value of the log of observed employment 
becomes 
min w
















+ = , (2) 
where   is the probability that the labor market has an effective 
minimum wage.
) , , | ( min Z X w d E p =
6
  One implication of equation (2) is the justification of an empirical reduced-form 
regression that relates the log of employment (in a low-wage labor market) to the log of 
the minimum-wage and to a set of demand and supply factors.
7  Another implication is 
that the coefficient on the log of the minimum wage equation identifies the labor-demand 
elasticity, if corrected by dividing the estimated coefficient by an estimate of the 
percentage of the labor market that actually receives the minimum wage (this type of 
                                                 
6 One caveat in the derivation of equation (2) should be noted.  It would be preferable to 
interpret d in equation (1) as the percentage of the labor market in which the minimum 
wage is effective, allowing for the possibility that minimum-wage firms coexist with 
above-minimum firms in the same industry and labor market.  With this interpretation, 
the derivation of equation (1) follows as before, but the derivation of equation (2) 
becomes more complicated.  We would either need to take the log of equation (1), which 
does not simplify, or we would need separate data on the log of employment in 
minimum-wage and above-minimum wage firms in the market to use in estimating 
equation (2).  A direct estimation of equation (1) is made quite difficult in our case by the 
large number of fixed effects we wish to control for in our empirical models. 
7 This justification for including supply factors in an employment/minimum-wage 
equation was noted by Neumark and Wascher (1994) in their argument that enrollment 
rates should be in their employment equations. 
  10correction is noted in Brown, 1999).   Alternatively, an equation for the average wage in 
the labor market could be estimated.  Using a logic similar to that for deriving equation 
(2), the reduced-form log-wage equation is 
  ) / log(
1
) 1 ( ) log( ) , , | ) (log( min min Z X p w p Z X w w E
β γ −
− + = ,   (3) 
from which an estimate of p is readily obtainable.  Dividing the minimum-wage 
coefficient in the employment equation by this estimate would then provide an estimate 
of the labor-demand elasticity. 
  While this approach is appropriate for infinitesimal changes in the minimum 
wage, it ignores the fact that observed changes in the minimum wage also increase the 
likelihood that the minimum wage is effective in a market, thereby causing p to change.  
One way to incorporate this influence is to model p as an explicit function of observables.  
This function should include any factors that would lead to a higher likelihood of the 
minimum wage being effective in the market.  A simple strategy is to model this 
probability as a linear function of these characteristics.  Arguably, any factor that would 
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In practice, we specify  
 ) log( ) log( ) log( 3 2 min 1 0 Z X w p α α α α + + + = . 
Substituting in equation (2) provides an equation with interactions between all variables, 
given that p appears as part of the coefficient for each variable.  In our estimated models, 
  11we primarily handle the varying impact of minimum wages on employment by including 
interactions of all variables with the minimum wage.
8   
  An alternative approach that allows the minimum wage to explicitly affect the 
proportion affected is to consider the impact of discrete changes in the minimum wage.   
For example, suppose that in our model we have an increase in the log minimum wage 
equal to  .  Let   indicate that the minimum wage was effective in the market 
both before and after the change,  that is was not effective in either case, and  that it 
became effective only after the increase.  Then the change in employment is equal to 
) log( min w ∆ 1 d
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init
β γ
β β .  (4) 
If measures of the “proportion affected” ( 3 1 d d + ) are available for individual 
markets, this equation could be used to identify the labor-demand elasticity by 
incorporating this proportion as a variable in the equation.  (Even if all markets 
experienced the same minimum-wage change, the labor-demand elasticity would be 
identified from the variation in the proportion affected.)  This type of approach has been 
used in several papers by Card, and Card and Kruger (as discussed in Card and Krueger, 
1995), although their estimated equations do not exactly follow the structure of equation 
                                                 
8 The fact that β p appears as part of the coefficient for all three variables in equation (2) 
suggests that additional information is potentially available by imposing this restriction in 
estimating interactions between all variables in the model.  However, any such 
identification would rely on the assumption that the model is correctly specified; that is, 
in the absence of minimum-wage laws, there would have been no interactions between 
the regressors determining employment. 
  12(4).
9  In our case, data on the proportion affected is not available.  Although it may be 
possible to model the probability of the market being affected by the minimum wage 
increase (in a manner similar to the modeling of p discussed above), we did not pursue 
that strategy here. 
  An estimation of the model in equations (2) and (3) requires data that allow a 
focus on an industry or group of workers likely to be affected by the minimum wage.  We 
also need information on local labor market conditions that might be related to the 
probability that the minimum wage is effective for that industry or group.  In the next 
section, we discuss our approach to estimation using U.S. data on county-level 
employment in the restaurant-and-bar sector. 
 
III. Data and Statistical Approach 
Previous research on minimum-wage impacts has generally chosen one of two strategies.  
One is to use aggregated data on employment for a particular group of workers (most 
commonly, teenagers), where the aggregation is generally at the state or national level.  A 
second approach has been to focus on a single sector of the economy – most commonly, 
fast food restaurants – and to examine employment changes surrounding a limited 
number of minimum-wage changes in a small number of geographic areas.  Our approach 
is similar to the latter in focusing on a particular sector, but similar to the former in 
considering variation in the minimum wage across a large number of geographic areas.     
The primary data source for the estimation of our models is the Quarterly Census 
of Employment and Wages (QCEW) from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).  The 
                                                 
9 In cases where  is not identical across markets, these authors do not include 
this variable in the equation, nor do they include the initial value of the minimum wage. 
) log( min w ∆
  13QCEW reports quarterly county-level payroll data on private employment and earnings 
for narrowly defined industries.  These data are collected from paperwork employers file 
in conjunction with the unemployment insurance program.  All firms with workers 
subject to state and federal unemployment insurance laws are represented in the data, 
which (according to the BLS) covers 99.7 percent of all wage and salary civilian 
employment.  The industry of all firms in the data is coded according to the North 
American Industrial Coding System (NAICS), and aggregations of the data by county, 
industry, and quarter are available to users, beginning with the initial data collection for 
the first quarter of 1990.  
  The data found within the QCEW survey have many advantages over other 
employment surveys.  It provides census (rather than sample) observations of 
employment and earnings for detailed industrial specifications within a large number of 
narrowly defined geographic regions.  The county level of aggregation provides a 
reasonable approximation of a labor market, especially for the restaurant-and-bar sector. 
Even in metropolitan areas with several counties, the large number of employers in this 
sector within a county (lowering the necessity of long commutes) suggests that potential 
employees would typically look to nearby establishments as a source of employment. 
That said, the QCEW is not without blemish.  The survey does not distinguish 
between part-time and full time employees, and there is no measure of hours worked or 
the average wage.  The sole earnings measure available is data on the average quarterly 
payroll of establishments by sector in the county, which we divide by total employment 
  14in the corresponding sector to construct a measure of average earnings per worker.
10  
Even so, the QCEW provides accurate and comprehensive measures of employment and 
earnings in highly disaggregated markets, and represents a new data source that has been 
underutilized in research examining minimum-wage impacts on employment.   
As noted in the previous section, we wish to supplement data on employment and 
earnings from QCEW with additional measures that might reflect supply-and-demand 
factors in low-wage labor markets in a particular county.  Our basic econometric model is  
 log(Yist) = φ log(MWst)+ γXist + µi + τt + εist  ,     (5) 
where Yist denotes either industry employment or earnings in county i and state s during 
period t, MWst is the natural log of the real minimum wage, Xist is a vector of supply and 
demand factors, µi and τt are fixed county and time effects, and εist is the idiosyncratic 
error term.  The county effect should control for any fixed aspects of the county that 
might affect the labor market, including any persistent differences in institutional, 
economic, or demographic characteristics of counties that might affect employment or 
earnings.  The quarter effect should control for any national-level macroeconomic effects.  
Controls included in X, then, are intended to reflect how a county’s labor market might 
vary over time in a manner that differs from other counties. 
The primary dependent variables are formed from an extract of quarterly 
observations of county-level employment and earnings for the Food Service and 
Drinking Places sector (NAICS sector number 722) in the years 1990-2005.  This sector 
includes traditional full-service restaurants, fast food restaurants, cafeterias, and stand- 
                                                 
10 This measure includes most wage-like compensation, including tips, bonuses, stock 
options, and employer contributions to retirement plans. 
 
  15alone bars.  The BLS does censor sector-specific observations on employment and 
earnings if the number of establishments in the county is below a certain level.
11 We 
perform most of our estimation on a balanced panel of counties, and so exclude any 
counties that did not meet the censoring threshold in any of the quarters from 1990 to 
2005.
12  Focusing on just the general restaurant-and-bar sector, we have a balanced panel 
of 1,825 counties, providing 116,800 quarterly observations – or roughly 58 percent of 
the potential sample of 3,143 counties in the United States.
  We also wish to estimate 
models for sub-sectors of the restaurant-and-bar sector, although as we increase the level 
of industrial disaggregation the rate of censoring also increases slightly.  
The minimum wage variable is calculated as the higher of the state minimum 
wage (if one exists) and the federal minimum wage.  Information on state minimum 
wages was collected from the discussion of state labor-law changes presented annually in 
the January edition of the Monthly Labor Review, along with previously published 
information on state minimum wages at the start of our sample period (see Addison and 
Blackburn, 1999).  In the first quarter of 1990, there were fifteen states with minimum-
wage levels above the federal mandate of $3.35.  Over the next 63 quarters there were 75 
state-level increases in the minimum wage exceeding the federal standard, as well as four 
separate federal minimum wage increases.   
                                                 
11 BLS withholds publication of data when necessary to protect the identity and data of 
cooperating employers, as there are industry/county combinations where the QCEW data 
would include a very small number of employers. These data are suppressed in the 
QCEW public-use data for that industry/county, but may be included in the data at less 
detailed levels of aggregation (for example, in a more general definition of industry for 
that county).    
12 Most counties either have valid observations for all 64 quarters, or have no valid 
observations for any of the 64 quarters.  There are 634 counties with valid observations 
for part but not all of the time period; we discuss estimation incorporating this set of 
counties in section V. 
  16Although the use of fixed-effects deals with many of the problems caused by 
differences in county characteristics that are unchanging over the sample period, the 
inclusion of additional controls is needed to capture the effects of other factors that may 
influence employment or earnings and change across the sample over time.  In attempting 
to measure county-specific, time-varying supply and demand factors that might influence 
employment and earnings, the depth of the QCEW survey is again useful.  As the QCEW 
survey provides observations at all NAICS aggregation levels, data on total county 
employment and average weekly earnings for all industries combined is also available.   
The inclusion of total county employment and earnings helps to control for the county-
level status of the labor market.  In particular, the average earnings variable may reflect 
the tendency for supply-and-demand factors to lead to high wages in general in that 
county, suggesting that the competitive wage in the restaurant-and-bar industry is also 
likely to be higher.   
Other measures that may be relevant to outcome indicators in low-wage labor 
markets were obtained from sources other than the QCEW.  We view the population of 
the county as a factor that could directly affect both labor supply and demand.  To 
incorporate this factor, we obtained population estimates from the U.S. Census Bureau’s 
Population Estimates Program.  Unemployment rates for prime-age males are often 
included in models of minimum-wage effects. Unemployment rates at the county level 
are available from the Local Area Unemployment Survey (LAUS), though the best we 
  17could do was assemble unemployment measures for all workers, not just for prime-age 
men.
13  
A final control variable is a measure of school enrollment at the state level, taken 
from the Current Population Survey (CPS).  This variable comprises the percentage of 
individuals aged 16-24 years enrolled in school.  It is based on answers to the CPS 
question: “Last week, were you enrolled in a high school, college, or university?” The 
enrollment rate is generally thought to reflect supply factors, a higher percentage of 
young individuals not in school serving to increase the supply of a part of the workforce 
that is heavily associated with the restaurant-and-bar sector (see Neumark and Wascher, 
1994).  It can also reflect demand factors, as students (especially college students) may be 
less likely to eat at restaurants.  The inclusion of this variable in minimum-wage models 
has been controversial, as it is argued that the enrollment choice may itself be a function 
of the decision to work (see Card, Katz and Krueger, 1994).
14  To some extent, the 
reverse causality issues surrounding the enrollment rate are lessened by using a higher 
level of aggregation in calculating the enrollment rate.  Although we fail to capture 
specific enrollment-rate effects at the county level (for example, the location of a large 
university in the county), we do measure the extent to which the desire for higher levels 
                                                 
13 It is possible to get unemployment rates for prime-age men at the state level from the 
Current Population Survey.  We prefer a county-specific measure, and so did not use this 
in our primary analysis.  However, estimates using the CPS variable in place of the 
county-specific measure yielded very similar conclusions.  Results are available from the 
authors on request. 
14 Card, Katz, and Krueger also criticized the particular enrollment measure used by 
Neumark and Wascher (1992), and found that their results were sensitive to the choice of 
enrollment measure.  We use the Card, Katz and Krueger’s preferred measure, namely, 
one that allows individuals to be both employed and enrolled at the same time.   
  18of educational attainment are characteristic of that state (which could be determined, for 
example, by state-level tuition and scholarship policies for college enrollment).   
Our specification differs from those used in many recent minimum-wage studies 
in that our dependent variable is the log of employment, rather than an employment rate.  
If an employment rate were to be used, two possible measures suggest themselves.  One 
would be the percentage of all employed workers in the restaurant-and-bar sector, the 
other the percentage of the population in that sector, and the choice between the two was 
not obvious.  In any case, by including both the log of total employment and the log of 
total population as independent variables, our model can be thought of as an unrestricted 
version of a regression model that uses the log of either employment rate as the 
dependent variable. 
            Detailed summary statistics for all variables included in our models are given in 
Table 1.  Average employment in the restaurant-and-bar sector is 3,883 workers, which is 
about eight percent of average total private employment.  Average weekly earnings in 
restaurants and bars also fall substantially below the overall average earnings (31 percent 
of the average), although average earnings in restaurants and bars is a higher percentage 
(33 percent) of total earnings in counties with a state minimum above the average.  In 
counties in our sample where the state minimum was above the federal minimum at any 
time over the period studied, the excess averaged $0.90 above the federal value.  These 
counties also had both higher unemployment rates and enrollment rates.  The most 
noticeable difference is that both total employment and population in these counties were 
more than twice as large as in counties always at the federal minimum.  Above-federal-
minimum states tend to have a small number of highly populous counties, as reflected in 
  19the fact that 38 percent of states are in the above-federal-minimum category but less than 
ten percent of our county/quarter observations come from these states.  This substantial 
difference in size led us to consider weighted least squares estimation of our models, as 
discussed in the next section. 
  Finally, a few statistical issues arise in estimating our models.  The inclusion of 
fixed county effects and fixed time effects does not rule out correlation in the 
idiosyncratic error term (ε) within counties over time, or across counties at a point in 
time.  Ignoring this correlation can lead to severe biases in the standard errors, especially 
when the level of aggregation varies across the variables included in the model (see 
Moulton, 1990; Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan, 2004).  This is a particular concern in 
our case, as most variables are measured at the county level but minimum wages vary 
only at the state level.  In our reported estimates, all standard errors are calculated 
allowing for any type of correlation structure among the error terms for a given state.
15  
This approach to calculating standard errors is also robust to heteroskedasticity in ε , even 
when using weighted least squares estimates.  Although use of “clustered” standard errors 
has become commonplace in panel-data analysis, it has generally not been addressed in 
previous minimum wage studies.  
Second, we use a logarithmic specification for each of our dependent variables.  
Blackburn (2007) argues that estimated models that utilize the logarithm of a variable as 
the dependent variable will only provide consistent estimates of percentage effects on the 
underlying variable if the error term is distributed independently of the regressors.  For 
                                                 
15 As our data are county level, another approach would be to cluster at that level.  
Although this would allow for a general time-series structure in the errors for a given 
county, it would not allow for the possibility that counties in the same state could have 
correlated errors at a point in time.      
  20example, if the variance of the error terms is related to the value of the regressors, 
estimates of the logarithmic model will likely be inconsistent as estimates of percentage 
effects.  We examined the potential for heteroskedasticity in our data by using the 
residuals to estimate skedastic functions in which the variance is allowed to vary linearly 
with all of the regressors in our model.  The results did not suggest an important 
influence of the minimum wage on this variance, suggesting the use of logarithmic 
dependent variables is not likely a cause for concern when interpreting our regression 
estimates. 
 
IV.  Estimation Results 
A. Basic Models 
As a first examination of the correlation in the data, we estimated models that incorporate 
fixed county and time effects but for which the only right-hand side variable is the log of 
the minimum wage.  The dependent variables are the log of employment, and the log of 
average weekly earnings, both for the restaurant-and-bar sector.  The employment effects 
are reported in the first column of Table 2, and point to a statistically significant negative 
effect of the minimum wage on restaurant-and-bar employment.  The estimates in the 
second column strongly support the notion that increases in the minimum wage feed 
through into average weekly earnings in the restaurant-and-bar sector.  The implied 
estimate of the elasticity of labor demand in this sector is roughly -0.9.
16  The estimated 
coefficient for the minimum-wage variable is of a magnitude similar to that reported in 
                                                 
16 This is calculated as the ratio of the minimum wage coefficient estimate in the 
employment equation to the minimum wage coefficient estimate in the earnings equation, 
as suggested by equations (2) and (3). 
  21most analyses using state-level panel data (see, in particular, Neumark and Wascher, 
2006).
17
Estimated models that incorporate additional controls for supply-and-demand 
factors are reported in the third and fourth columns of Table 2.  The estimated minimum 
wage coefficients are similar to those in the equations without controls, and continue to 
suggest a labor demand elasticity of around -1.  Not surprisingly, increases in total 
employment and county population tend to be associated with increases in restaurant-
and-bar employment.  They also both have small positive effects on average earnings in 
restaurant and bars.  Counties with higher average earnings in general also appear to have 
higher sectoral earnings but lower employment.  This result is consistent with an inward 
shift of the labor supply schedule in this particular labor market.  There is little evidence 
of an enrollment-rate effect on employment, although this variable has a negative 
coefficient estimate in the average earnings equation. This result could reflect higher 
enrollment rates increasing supply (with restaurant-and-bar employment conducive to 
school attendance and work) while decreasing demand.  Unemployment rates do not 
appear to be an important factor in either equation.  
  Although estimated at the county level, these results are quite consistent with 
most of the earlier state-level studies.  As much of this early research has used standard 
errors appropriate only under ideal regression assumptions, our findings suggest that 
these results can be considered robust to inference that allows for heteroskedasticity and 
general intra-state correlation in the error terms. 
                                                 
17 On the other hand, these studies primarily looked at teenagers, a higher percentage of 
whom work at the minimum wage than is the case for overall employment in the 
restaurant-and-bar sector.  Given this difference, our basic estimates are perhaps larger in 
magnitude than traditionally observed in the literature. 
  22B. Weighted Estimation  
Our ordinary least squares estimators implicitly provide equal weight to each county, 
although it is not obvious that the assumption of equal weighting is appropriate.  
Research using geographically-oriented data often uses estimates that incorporate 
population-based weights.  One argument for doing so would be that the error variance is 
related to population, suggesting that a correction for this heteroskedasticity could 
improve efficiency.  The possibility we consider is that the idiosyncratic error terms in 
the log employment and log earnings equations tend to vary less for larger-sized 
populations, suggesting that large-population counties should play a greater role in 
estimation than small-population counties.  It is still possible to calculate standard errors  
that are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and intra-state correlation, such that a 
misspecification of the weight in our estimation should not lead to invalid inferences. 
  Our weighted least squares (WLS) estimates are reported in the final four columns 
of Table 2.  Two things are noteworthy about these estimates.  First, the standard errors 
are considerably smaller for the coefficient estimates of the minimum wage variable –    
in both specifications and for both dependent variables.  This would seem to be indicative 
of an increase in precision from weighting.  (On the other hand, this increase in precision 
is not suggested for most other variables in the equation.)  More importantly, the basis for 
a minimum wage effect on employment is lessened in the weighted results 
(notwithstanding the statistically significant coefficients), even though the standard errors 
  23fall.  In short, weighting substantially lowers the minimum-wage coefficient estimate in 
the employment equations (but not the earnings equations).
18   
  The difference in the weighted and unweighted coefficient estimates is somewhat 
surprising, as both should be consistent estimates of the true regression parameters. 
DuMouchel and Duncan (1983) note that a difference between weighted and unweighted 
estimates can reflect an omission of important factors from the equation.  One possibility 
could be that the minimum wage effect actually varies across counties, so that the 
weighted estimator better reflects the average effect in larger counties.  For example, 
large-population counties tend to have higher average wages; if the minimum wage 
coefficient for employment is lower in high-wage counties, we would expect a lower 
coefficient estimate when we weight larger counties more heavily.
19  The fact that these 
estimates differ suggests that we should consider a richer specification than used in Table 
2.  In the next subsection, we incorporate county-specific trends in our estimation and 
find this to be very important to our estimation results.   
C.  County-Specific Trends  
Our models control for systematic differences in restaurant-and-bar employment 
determination across counties, but only differences that are stable over time.  When using 
panels over a long-term period, this assumption of stable county effects may not be 
appropriate.  One straightforward way to generalize this specification of county effects is 
to also allow for a systematic change in the county-specific effect over time, where the 
degree of change can differ across counties.  This incorporation of unit-specific trends in 
                                                 
18 Some of the other coefficient estimates are also affected by the weighting; for example, 
the enrollment rate is now also statistically significant in the employment equation.  
19 In this case, the omitted factor would be an interaction between average wages and 
minimum wages. 
  24the error term of the model has become increasingly common in studies using long 
panels.
20  The inclusion of these trends helps to address the possibility that restaurant-
and-bar employment growth is trending differently in states that increased their minimum 
wages compared to states that stayed at the federal minimum (and so witnessed a 
declining trend in the real minimum wage). 
We modify our basic empirical model (equation 5) to include county-specific 
trends, that is 
 log(Yist) = φ log(MWst)+ γXist + µi + λit + τt + εist  ,                      (6) 
where λi is a trend coefficient that varies across counties.  Wooldridge (2002, pp. 315-
322) discusses two procedures for the estimation of this model.
21  It is possible to 
estimate the model using first differences, but we will save this discussion until later.  
Instead, an approach analogous to the fixed-effects estimator is to directly control for the 
county-specific constants and trends in the estimation, by sweeping out a county-specific 
linear trend for each variable in the model. This entails estimating a simple linear trend 
model for each variable in the equation, and using the residuals from these trend models 
to estimate the parameters of interest.
22  OLS estimation using these detrended variables 
is then appropriate (although the standard errors must be corrected to acknowledge the 
loss of  3,650 degrees of freedom).   Table 3 reports estimates using detrended data. 
                                                 
20 Dube, Lester, and Reich (2007) incorporate state-level trends in their county-level 
analysis of minimum wages, assuming that all counties in the same state follow the same 
trend.   
21This is often referred to as a “random growth model” when a logarithmic dependent 
variable is used.    
22This detrending process is essentially the extension of the de-meaning process used to 
estimate fixed-effects models.   
  25  After controlling for local trends, the estimated elasticity of restaurant-and-bar 
employment to the minimum wage is negative, but very small and statistically 
insignificant.  The estimated earnings elasticity is also somewhat smaller after 
detrending, but the impact is still significant.  As a result, the derived estimate of the 
labor-demand elasticity is quite small (-0.035).  Employment in the restaurant-and-bar 
sector tends to exhibit a downward long-term trend in states that have increased their 
minimum wages relative to states that have not, biasing the fixed-effects estimates in 
Table 2 towards finding a negative employment effect of minimum wages.
23  These 
results suggest that studies identifying employment effects by using variation in state 
minimum-wage laws need to worry about the role of spatial trends in their estimation. 
D.  Models with Interactions  
In section II, we noted that a simple demand-and-supply model should lead to a 
coefficient for the log of the minimum wage that is a function of the probability that the 
minimum wage is effective in that labor market.  Our results in Tables 2 and 3 help tie 
our data analysis to previous research on minimum-wage effects, but they do not account 
for the possibility that changes in observable factors could affect the likelihood that the 
minimum wage is binding in a given labor market.  To account for this possibility, we 
assume that the probability the minimum-wage is effective – p in equation (2) – is a 
linear function of the minimum wage, and of our demand and supply factors, namely, 
pist = α0 + α1log(MWst)+ α2Xist  .        ( 7 )  
                                                 
23 Unweighted estimates of the detrended model (not reported) are similar to the weighted 
estimates in Table 3, suggesting that the misspecification that may have led to differences 
in the Table 2 results is indeed handled by the inclusion of the county-specific trends. 
  26Our expectation is that higher minimum wages would make it more likely that the 
minimum wage has an effect (so α1<0).  Shifts in labor demand and supply should also 
influence whether the competitive wage is above the minimum; for example, we would 
expect higher average wages across all industries to increase the competitive wage in 
restaurant and bars, and so decrease p.  We can estimate the employment equation by 
extending equation (6) 
 log(Yist) = pβ log(MWst)+ γXist + µi + λit + τt + εist   , 
which after substituting equation (7) provides 
 log(Yist) = α0 βlog(MWst) + α1β log(MWst)
2 + α2β log(MWst)Xist  + 
      +  γXist + µi + λit + τt + εist .                                               (8) 
Equation (8) can be estimated by adding controls for the squared minimum-wage 
variable, along with interactions of the log minimum wage with X.  A similar equation 
would hold for the log-earnings model (although the labor-demand elasticity β would not 
now appear).  It would be possible to estimate the parameters by requiring that the α’s be 
the same in the employment and earnings equations, although we do not impose this 
restriction in our estimates.
24
  Estimates of the models incorporating interactions are presented in Table 4.  In 
these models, the interactions are formed by multiplying the log of the minimum wage 
times the other variables deviated from their sample means.  This implies that the non-
interacted minimum wage coefficient estimates can be treated as estimates when the other 
controls are equal to their means.  Models with and without county-specific trends are 
                                                 
24 Minimum-wage interactions do not appear to have been considered in the previous 
literature. The one exception is the use (in many studies) of the ratio of the minimum 
wage to the average wage, which in our framework can be interpreted as assuming  p is 
inversely proportional to the average wage.   
  27included in the table. The sensitivity of the results to incorporating these trends leads us 
to base our inferences on the last two columns of Table 4. 
  Estimates of the employment equation suggest that adding the interactions and 
squared terms does not provide explicit evidence that their inclusion is necessary, as the 
interaction coefficient estimates (and the squared-log-minimum-wage coefficient 
estimate) are not individually statistically significant.  That said, we are able to reject the 
hypothesis that jointly the interactions have no impact on our estimates (p-value=.003). 
On the other hand, there is a stronger evidence to suggest that the addition of these 
variables is relevant in the log-earnings equation.  The countywide average earnings 
variable has a statistically significantly negative coefficient estimate, suggesting that 
higher-wage counties will tend to have a lower probability of the minimum wage being 
effective.   The results also support an increasing impact of the unemployment rate on 
this probability, as we would expect.  The squared minimum wage variable has a 
statistically significantly positive coefficient estimate, suggesting higher minimum wages 
also increase p.  Although the other interactions are not statistically significant, it is less 
obvious that shifts in these other factors should have such a clear impact on the 
competitive wage.  For its part, the estimated minimum-wage impact on log earnings has 
a similar magnitude to earlier tables; for example, the elasticity of earnings with respect 
to the minimum wage at a minimum wage of $6 is estimated to be 0.183.
25
  The evidence that there are nonlinear and interaction effects in the earnings 
equation but not the employment equation may seem a weakness of the results, but this is 
in fact consistent with a very low labor-demand elasticity in the industry.  Given that the 
                                                 
25 This is the estimated elasticity when the values of the other supply-and-demand factors 
are at their sample means.   
  28minimum-wage interaction coefficients in the employment equation are all multiplied by 
this elasticity, it becomes difficult to obtain precise estimates when this elasticity is small.  
We see the model as consistent with the theoretical model discussed in section II, but 
with a small labor-demand elasticity leading to the minimum wage effect showing up 
mostly in earnings. 
 
V. Alternative Estimators and Samples 
A.  First-Difference Estimates 
Most of the minimum-wage research that has used long state-level panels on teenagers or 
young adults has employed fixed-effects estimators to control for systematic state effects.  
By comparison, research based on “natural experiments,” or a single change in the 
federal minimum wage, have used first-difference estimators to remove state effects.  
Either method is arguably appropriate given the specification in equation (5), as first-
differencing also removes the state effect from that equation.  Indeed, county-specific 
trends can easily be handled with a first-difference estimator, as the first difference of 
equation (6) gives 
∆log(Yist) = φ∆ log(MWst)+ γ∆Xist + λi + ∆τt + ∆εist   , 
so that an estimation of the first-difference equation using a fixed-effects estimator (with 
both county and quarter effects) should remove both fixed and trend effects at the county 
level from the model.  The appropriate manner of modeling p is not as clear in this model 
(see the discussion surrounding equation (4) in section II), so we chose to estimate a first-
difference model comparable to the models presented in Table 3.   
  29  Our basic first-difference estimates are presented in Table 5.  The estimated 
elasticity of restaurant-and-bar employment with respect to the minimum wage is 
positive, but is small and statistically insignificant.  The minimum-wage coefficient is 
estimated much less precisely with the first-difference estimator, providing a very wide 
confidence interval for the estimated elasticity.  This factor leads us to base our primary 
inference on our detrended results, discussed above.  Another worrisome aspect of the 
first-difference results is the negative but statistically insignificant coefficient estimate in 
the earnings equation (although once again estimated with a very wide confidence 
interval). 
  In estimating the same empirical model, the first-difference estimates are likely 
sensitive to only short-run effects of minimum wages, while the detrended model is more 
likely to be sensitive to long-run reactions.  We estimated our detrended model with one 
or two lags of the minimum wage, but found results similar to our non-lagged results.  To 
examine the possibility that a quarterly change is too short to capture a long-run 
minimum-wage effect, we also estimated models using a four-period difference in all 
variables.
26  Presented in the final two columns of Table 5, these results provides 
estimates that are in general similar to the detrended estimates (of Table 3), especially for 
the minimum-wage coefficients.  Although studies that use quarterly differences to 
estimate minimum-wage coefficients may be missing some of the impact, the evidence 
                                                 
26 In particular, we formed differences as the value of the variable in the current quarter 
minus its value in the same quarter of the previous year.  This approach is likely to create 
a moving-average process in the error term of the estimated equation, but this does not 
bias the coefficient estimates and is handled by clustering at the state level in calculating 
our standard errors. 
  30here suggests a longer-run difference can provides evidence similar to a model estimated 
using non-differenced data that have been detrended.   
B.  State Minimum Changes vs. Federal Minimum Changes 
A concern sometimes mentioned in the literature centers on the possibility that responses 
to increases in the minimum wage may differ if the change is due to a state initiative 
rather than a federally-mandated increase.  The fact that state-panel minimum-wage 
models are generally identified only from state minimum increases formed the basis of 
the critique of Burkhauser, Couch, and Wittenburg (2000), leading them to estimate 
models that omitted year effects.
27  Neumark and Wascher (2006) cite a working paper 
by Bazen and Le Gallo (2006) as estimating first-difference models that allow changes in 
the minimum wage due to state law to have different effects than changes due to a 
federally-legislated change, with evidence of negative employment effects only for 
federally-legislated changes.
28  This would be consistent with the argument that state 
minimum wages are increased primarily when negative employment effects are less 
likely, leading to an upward bias in the usual state-panel estimates. 
  We examined this issue in a manner that still allows us to use non-first-
differenced data.  Burkhauser, Couch, and Wittenburg (2000) are correct in arguing that 
that the traditional state-panel estimates are identified only if there are some states with 
minimum wages above the federal.  The minimum-wage coefficient is largely identified 
                                                 
27 We re-estimated our Table 2 specification for the employment equation excluding 
quarterly effects, and did not find evidence of employment effects for the minimum wage 
variable. This result suggests that the negative effects generated in their paper by ignoring 
time effects may be specific to the time frame studied.  
28 We did a similar estimation with our first-difference model, interacting the change in 
the minimum with a dummy variable for whether or not the change was due to a federal 
increase rather than a state increase. However, we did not find evidence of a statistically 
significant interaction. 
  31by the comparison of employment in states with state minima above the federal with 
those at the federal minimum, in any given year.  But this does not imply that all of the 
variation in the minimum wage is due solely to state-level changes; for example, federal 
increases will tend to lower the variation across states in a given year.  Our concern, 
therefore, is that the states that never choose to be above the federal minimum may have 
systematically different minimum wage effects on employment than those who fix state 
minima above the federal.  For example, states where the minimum wage is likely to be 
effective may need to worry more about disemployment effects, and so may choose to 
stay at the federal minimum.   
A quick way to check for this possibility is to re-estimate the model using data 
from only those states that ever raised their state minimum over the federal minimum 
during the period under study.  These detrended estimates are reported in Table 6, and 
actually provide more evidence of a negative employment effect from minimum wages 
than the comparable full-sample estimates from Table 3.  This estimate is still statistically 
insignificant, but it does suggest that worries about the selectivity in state-minimum 
increases do not seem to be relevant in our data. 
C.  Using the Unbalanced-Panel Observations 
Our estimates are calculated using only counties with a sufficient number of 
establishments in the restaurant-and-bar industry to avoid censoring in the QCEW public 
use files. This limits problems associated with counties entering and leaving the sample 
because of the number of establishments rising above and falling below the censoring 
threshold.  To consider the sensitivity of our results to this strategy, we estimated models 
that also included counties with missing information for at least one (but not all) of the 
  32quarters.  The weighted results for employment and earnings are presented in the first and 
second columns of Table 7, and suggest similar conclusions to the comparable balanced-
panel estimates reported earlier in Table 3. 
  These unbalanced-panel estimates suffer from a potential bias if the minimum 
wage affects the probability that employment is censored in the QCEW because it lowers 
the number of establishments in the county below the censoring threshold.  To explore 
whether this type of bias might be important, we estimated linear-probability models for 
the probability that a county is censored in a given quarter.  The estimated equation is 
analogous to equation (6), with a dummy variable for being censored serving as the 
dependent variable.  The estimates are calculated using only the sample of counties with 
partial information on restaurant-and-bar employment over the 64 quarters.  These 
estimates are reported in the final column of Table 7. As can be seen, they fail to provide 
a clear indication that minimum wages have an impact on the probability of being 
censored in the QCEW. 
D.  Separate Estimates for Fast Food and Traditional Service Restaurants  
 
Up to this point, our estimates have used employment across all establishments in the 
Food Service and Drinking Places sector of the QCEW.  It is possible to disaggregate 
these sectors, as the NAICS coding system distinguishes four sub-sectors of the industry.  
Separate estimation for two of the sub-sectors was not pursued, given the large number of 
censored counties that occur in the (Alcoholic Beverage) Drinking Places sub-sector and 
the Special Food Services sub-sector (comprising caterers and mobile food services).  
However, we have re-estimated our models separately for the remaining two sub-sectors: 
  33Full-Service Restaurants (NAICS Code 7221) and Limited-Service Eating Places 
(NAICS Code 7222).    
  One reason for examining Limited-Service Eating Places separately is that this 
sub-sector provides a better link to the previous minimum-wage studies that have focused 
on fast-food restaurants.  We did not isolate this industry initially as our estimate of the 
average weekly wage within the limited-service sub-sector was not substantially different 
from that in the full-service sub-sector.  But there are a number of reasons to anticipate 
that minimum-wage effects could differ across full-service and limited-service sub-
sectors, even if they share a similar probability of being affected by minimum-wage 
increases.  If labor costs are a greater share of total costs in limited-service restaurants, 
then the labor-demand elasticity could be larger (in magnitude) in that sector.  On the 
other hand, the product-demand elasticity is likely larger in the full-service sector, 
suggesting the labor-demand elasticity should be greater there as well.  Increases in the 
minimum wage could also have differential affects on product demand in the two sub-
sectors.  Finally, our average weekly wage estimates do not reflect possible differences in 
average hours worked per week; if average hours are lower in full-service restaurants, it 
may be that there is actually a greater probability of the minimum wage being effective in 
limited-service restaurants (as the average hourly wage would be lower).
29
  Estimates of our employment and earnings equations by sub-sector are provided 
in Table 8.  These weighted estimates incorporate county-specific trends, and so should 
be comparable to the weighted estimates in Table 3.  These estimates provide a 
                                                 
29 Information on hourly wages within these two sub-sectors is not available from U.S. 
Census sources, as the Census industry codes do not distinguish between limited-service 
and full-service restaurants. 
  34marginally statistically significant negative effect of minimum wages on employment in 
the limited-service sub-sector (implying a labor-demand elasticity of -0.33), while the 
estimated effect in the full-service sub-sector is positive and statistically significant.  The 
estimated impact on earnings is also larger in the limited-service sub-sector, consistent 
with the speculation that minimum wages are more likely to be effective in limited-
service rather than full-service restaurants.    
 
VI.  Summary and Discussion  
 
In the present treatment, we have used county-level data on employment and earnings in 
the restaurant-and-bar sector to consider the impact of minimum wage changes on wage 
and employment outcomes in low-wage labor markets.  The analytical framework of our 
empirical model is similar to the literature that has used state-level panels to estimate 
minimum-wage impacts, but our focus is on a sector that has primarily been analyzed 
using data sets with insufficient geographic variation to reliably identify minimum-wage 
effects.  We find our estimates to be consistent with a simple competitive model of the 
restaurant-and-bar labor market in which supply-and-demand factors also affect the 
probability that a minimum wage will be effective if any given time period.   
  In our estimated models, a control for local-level trends has an important 
influence on the estimated minimum-wage coefficients.  Employment in the restaurant-
and-bar sector appears to exhibit a downward long-term trend in states that have 
increased their minimum wages relative to states that have not, thereby biasing fixed-
effects estimates towards finding a negative employment effect of minimum wages.  Our 
findings imply that studies seeking to identify employment effects by using variation in 
  35state minimum-wage laws need to be greatly concerned about the role of spatial trends in 
their estimation.  After making this correction, we fail to find statistically significant 
evidence that increasing the minimum wage reduces restaurant-and-bar employment.  
This may be the result of a very low-labor demand elasticity in this sector, one that leads 
to statistical difficulty in uncovering any employment decline.  It could also be that 
minimum-wage changes affect product demand in this sector, which would also mitigate 
any minimum-wage impacts in equilibrium.  The results generated for separate sub-
sectors of the industry are intriguing in this regard.  Our finding that there is no evidence 
for disemployment in the overall sector seems to be the sum of a small negative effect in 
the limited-service sector and a small positive effect in the full-service sector.
30  This 
difference in effects could be due to differential impacts of minimum wages on costs in 
the two sub-sectors, but it might also reflect relative product-demand shifts as higher 
wages lead to full-service restaurants being more attractive than their limited-service 
counterparts.    
  With a few exceptions, minimum-wage case studies have focused on the 
restaurant sector.  The obvious justification for this focus is the relatively large 
percentage of workers who are paid at the federal minimum in that sector.  The high 
labor-turnover rate characteristic of that sector also suggests that adjustments of 
employment to changes in costs can be fairly rapid.  Yet there are a number of 
weaknesses attached to this restricted focus. At a county level, restaurants may tend to 
have lower labor-demand elasticities than establishments in other sectors that can be 
more mobile in their choice of location. (Production in the restaurant sector needs to be 
                                                 
30 The two sub-sectors are roughly equal in total employment in any given quarter.  
  36geographically close to the consumer, but this is not true in other sectors such as 
manufacturing.)  There may also be a level of product differentiation in the restaurant 
sector that allows a significant pass-through of higher labor costs into product prices.  
Accordingly, the case-study emphasis on the restaurant sector may not offer the best 
environment for uncovering negative employment effects.  In the future, we intend to 
examine minimum-wage impacts in other disaggregated low-wage sectors at the county 
level. 
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  40Table 1  Descriptive Statistics for the County Sample: 1990-2005 
 












Counties with  
State Minimum Wage 
Above Federal Level 
(at least one quarter)  
















































Sample Size  116,800  105,642  11,158 
Note:  All wage and earnings variables are in 2005 dollars. 
Sources:  Bureau of Labor Statistics, Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW); Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, Monthly Labor Review;  Bureau of Labor Statistics, Local Area Unemployment Survey (LAUS); U.S. 
Bureau of the Census, Population Estimates Program;  and U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Survey 
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Table 2  Regression Estimates of Employment and Earnings Equations for the Restaurant-and-Bar Sector 
Ordinary Least Squares 
(a) 





Independent Variable  Employment   Earnings   Employment  Earnings    Employment   Earnings   Employment  Earnings 

























































Note: Each column of estimates is from a separate regression.  All dependent variable and independent variables are in logarithmic form, with the exceptions 
of the unemployment rate and enrollment rate. The standard errors in parentheses are corrected to allow for possible non-independence of observations 
within a county. All regressions included fixed-effects for county and quarter.  Regressions in panel (b) are weighted by the average population in their 
respective county.  **,* denote statistical significance at the 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
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Table 3  Regression Estimates for Equations with County-Level Trends 
































See Notes to Table 2.  All regressions are weighted by the county’s average population.  **,* denote 
statistical significance at the 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
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Table 4  Regression Estimates with Minimum Wage Interactions 
Without County-Specific Trends 
(a) 






Employment   Earnings    Employment  Earnings 
























































Minimum Wage Interactions        










































See Notes to Table 3.  All minimum wage interactions were created by multiplying the minimum wage by the 
deviation of each control variable from its own mean.  **,* denote statistical significance at the 0.05 and 0.10 
levels, respectively.  
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Table 5  Estimates of Differenced Regressions for Employment and Earnings 
First Difference  
(a) 




Independent Variable   Employment   Earnings    Employment  Earnings 
















































See Notes to Table 3.  **,* denote statistical significance at the 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
  45 
 
Table 6  Regression Estimates Using the Sample of Counties with State-Law 
Variation. 
 Independent Variable   Employment 
 
   Earnings 
 


























See Notes to Table 3.  The sample size in each regression is equal to 11,158. **,* denote statistical 
significance at the 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively.  
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Table 7  Regression Estimates using the Unbalanced Sample 
 Independent Variable  Employment 
 
Earnings  Dummy for Being 
Uncensored 






































See Notes to Table 3.  The dependent variables are in logarithmic form, except for the uncensored 
dummy.  The sample size in the first two columns is 157,205, while the sample size in the last 
column is 72,806.  **,* denote statistical significance at the 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
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Table 8  Regression Estimates for Sub-sectors of the Restaurant-and-Bar Sector 
Limited-Service Restaurants  
  




Independent Variable  Employment   Earnings    Employment  Earnings 
















Total Employment  0.657** 







Total Average Weekly 
Earnings 
-0.151** 
























Sample Size  115,008    105,088 
See Notes to Table 3.  **,* denote statistical significance at the 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
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